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There is a “tragedy of the traffic” analogous to the “tragedy of the commons” that can be caused
by overtaking. We analyze the effect of overtaking in a minimal model of vehicular traffic, the Nagel-
Schreckenberg model, with two types of drivers: drivers that overtake and drivers that do not. We
show that, under certain circumstances, overtaking is good because it increases the road capacity
and minimizes the driver’s mean time spent on the road. However, when these conditions are not
met, overtaking is harmful to all. More specifically, we found that a social dilemma emerges in the
vicinity of the transition to the congested traffic if the probability of random deceleration is low,
which can also happen in more realistic single-lane models. The essential mechanism creating the
social dilemma is the abrupt deceleration when the overtaking car returns to its lane. We analyze
how the payoffs depend on the frequency of strategies in the population to conclude that the drivers
that overtake are defectors and the ones that do not are cooperators, analogous to the strategies in
“tragedy of the commons” class of games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Overtaking on single-lane roads can be daunting even
for experienced drivers. Whenever possible, drivers in
a hurry would like to overtake the slow ones and every-
one would be satisfied, as the slow drivers would keep
their pace and the fast ones would save time. However,
transportation systems exhibit many unexpected social
phenomena related to the tragedy of the commons [1].
The individuals want to reach their destinations safely
and as fast as possible. However, the limited availability
of space may create social dilemmas. A trivial example
that clearly shows the struggle for a common resource
is the choice between using public transportation or pri-
vate vehicle at moderate or high traffic densities. Because
public transportation is generally slow, the drivers may
arrive at their destination faster if they use their cars in-
stead of public transportation. However, jammed traffic
sets in because of the large number of vehicles and, as a
result, all individuals may spend more time in the traffic.
Another example is the increase of traffic when an ad-
ditional fast highway is built to connect two previously
unconnected locations, known as the Braess’ paradox [2].
The temptation to take the fast lane to reduce the time
travel may attract all drives to the fast highway, creating
congestion that otherwise would never happen [3].
The long commutes are becoming an increasing prob-
lem in the big metropolis. People experiencing them are
more stressed, with serious implications for their well-
being [4]. It is a natural assumptions that drivers would
like to overtake slow vehicles if it reduces their commute
times. The most basic environment which allows over-
taking is the conventional two-way road with one lane in
each direction. The drivers should abide by the traffic
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rules, driving along their lane and overtaking only when
it is allowed and safe. Empirical studies on overtaking
in two-way highways are scarce. Typically, these stud-
ies measure the headway distance when the overtaking
starts, the length and the duration of the overtaking, the
speed differences, the distance of moving back to lane [5].
Three types of overtaking strategies have been observed
in these environments: the flying, whereby the driver
overtakes without reducing the speed; the acceleration,
whereby the driver first reduces the speed and, when al-
lowed, accelerates to overtake; and the “piggybacking”,
whereby the driver follows another driver that is over-
taking [5, 6]. These three strategies are considered safe
strategies. The safety conditions are determined essen-
tially by the gap availability in front of the slow car, the
gap in the lane with the opposite flow, and the relative
speeds. However, drivers can underestimate the safety
criteria or can even become impatient, performing dan-
gerous manoeuvres [7]. In particular, the proximity of
the oncoming vehicle can force the overtaking driver to
move back to the lane as soon as possible. In one study,
it was found that in 10% of the cases the drivers were
forced to move back to their lane [8].
Vehicular traffic is a very complex system. Impor-
tant developments have been made at the theoretical
level through computer simulations, empirical data anal-
ysis and observation of human experience in simulation
machines (see the excellent reviews [9–11]). The Nagel
and Schreckenberg’s cellular automaton model (NaSch
model) is a well studied minimal model of vehicular traffic
in single-lane environments [12]. This model is important
because, despite its simplicity, it reproduces fundamen-
tal features of vehicular traffic such as the transition from
the free-flow traffic to the congested traffic and the spon-
taneous formation of jams. The NaSch model is closely
related to the asymmetric simple exclusion process [9, 13]
and to stochastic growth models of one-dimensional sur-
faces in a two-dimensional medium [10, 14]. Many gen-
eralizations of the NaSch model have been done and. A
2few examples are the addition of a slow-to-start rule [15],
multi-lane non-homogeneous environment [16], probabil-
ity of random deceleration depending on the velocity of
the car [17, 18], inclusion of brake light to produce a more
comfortable driving experience [19] and non-null proba-
bility of accidents [20–22]. More examples can be found
in the reviews [9, 10]. Comparison between the models
and the empirical data can be found in [23–25]. A spe-
cially important example for our discussion is a stochastic
overtaking strategy implemented in the NaSch model in
[26]. In their work, when some conditions are satisfied,
the overtaking happens with probability q. The authors
show that increasing q also increases traffic flow. They
also comment that when the probability of overtaking
is high, the system remains in a high-flow regime even
for high concentrations of cars [26–28] due to an over-
acceleration of the overtaking vehicles implicit in their
algorithm. However, overtaking should play a negligi-
ble role in the high concentration traffic because there is
little space available to the manoeuvre.
The possibility of overtaking may put the individuals’
self-interest in conflict with the interest of the others,
giving rise to social dilemmas. A social dilemma is char-
acterized by the possibility of choosing a strategy, the
defection strategy, that provides higher payoffs to the
self at the expense of the others, but making the popula-
tion worse off if all adopt the defection strategy instead
of the cooperative strategy [29]. In one work, the authors
implemented a model with two-lanes and introduced two
types of drivers [30, 31]. The cooperators are stuck in the
slow lane, whereas the defectors may change lanes. The
authors show that, if the car density is high, a weak social
dilemma emerges because of the perturbations caused by
the vehicles in the fast lane when fluctuations in the local
distribution of vehicles appear.
Here, we study the potential conflict between self-
interest and social payoff that may arise as the result
of overtaking in the rather simple scenario of the single
lane. Overtaking in single-lane models can be interpreted
as an approximation to overtaking in undivided two-way
road in the limit of negligible opposite flow, where the
drivers can use the free opposite lane to overtake. This
situation is typical of the morning and late commutes,
where drivers go to downtown in the morning and return
home in the evening. Even if there is a non-negligible
opposite flow, overtaking in single-lane can model the
behavior of risk-prone drivers that change lanes quickly.
In contrast to the model analyzed in [26–28], which ana-
lyzes a homogeneous population where all drivers adopt
the same a stochastic strategy, we introduce two types
of drivers: cooperators, that follows the NaSch model,
and defectors, that try to overtake whenever possible.
We show that overtaking can create a social dilemma at
intermediate concentration of vehicles if the probability
of random deceleration is small. We discuss the nature
of the interactions and the proper way to quantify the
payoff of the individual. The classification as defectors
and cooperators is closely related to the usual classifica-
tion used in the Tragedy of the Commons class of game.
Finally, we analyzed more real models that soften the
acceleration of the vehicles and we found out that the
drastic deceleration occurring when a vehicle completes
the overtaking is the essential mechanism creating the
social dilemma.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe the
model in Sec. II (the details of the algorithm are placed
in the appendix). The main results are split into three
parts: in the Sec. III.A, we show the analytical results;
in the Sec. III.B we introduce the main the concepts
and we analyze the social dilemma; in the Sec. III.C
we implement the overtaking strategy to a more realis-
tic model, known for its accuracy to experimental data
regarding single-lane traffic, and discuss the mechanisms
responsible for the emergence of the dilemma. We finish
in the Sec. IV with a brief discussion of the results and
the conclusion.
II. THE MODEL
The NaSch model represents vehicular traffic as a dis-
crete process in space and time. The cars are represented
as particles moving on a 1-dimensional lattice with peri-
odic boundaries. Each site is either occupied by a single
car or empty, and the velocities of the vehicles assume
values in the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 5}. The vehicles following
the NaSch dynamics (henceforth called cooperators) up-
date their position and velocity in four steps as follows.
Let xn and vn be the position and the velocity of the n-
th car at time t. In the first step, the speed is increased
in one unit: vn → min(vn + 1, vmax). In the second
step, the speed may be reduced to avoid collision with
the front car: vn → min(vn, (xn+1 − xn) − 1). In the
third step, there is a chance of a randomly deceleration,
which happens with probability p: vn → max(vn − 1, 0).
After all velocities are updated, the position is updated:
~xn → ~xn + ~vn. We should mention that if the random
deceleration comes before the second step, it would have
a null effect whenever the second step takes effect. The
random deceleration is necessary to scale the negative ef-
fects caused by the deceleration in the second step, which
initiates the spontaneous formation of jams [9–11].
Based on the behavior of some drivers that use the
lane with the opposite flow to make the overtaking ma-
noeuvre, which is observed in experimental data [5, 6],
we made a minimal change to the NaSch model to allow
overtaking when safety conditions are met. We do not
consider any constraints coming from the opposite lane
traffic, which is assumed to be negligible in our analy-
sis. The dynamics is, therefore, effectivelly unidimen-
sional with small windows exhibiting non-unidimensional
dynamics when overtaking happens (for the necessity of
such windows for the overtaking see [9]). The update rule
for the vehicles following our algorithm (henceforth called
defectors) is very similar to the NaSch model. The defec-
tors will attempt to overtake as many vehicles as possible,
3constrained to the condition that the defector will over-
take only if its velocity is high enough to arrive in front of
the overtaking vehicles considering their updated speeds.
If it is not possible to overtake the last vehicle within
its range, the defectors will try to overtake one less ve-
hicle, until overtaking is no longer possible. In this case,
the defector behaves as a cooperator. Since the random
deceleration factor may be interpreted as the driver’s re-
sponse to the imperfections of the highway [32], and both
strategies coexist in the same environment, both defec-
tors and cooperators are subjected to the same random
deceleration. Figure 1 illustrates the update rule of the
defectors. See the Appendix for the details of the algo-
rithm.
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FIG. 1. Illustration of the overtaking rule. The blue and the
red squares represent a driver to be overtaken and a vehi-
cle trying to overtake, respectively. The numbers inside the
squares are their current speed, the black rod represents the
restriction imposed by the safety condition, and the arrows
indicate the position in the next step. In this example, the
defector does not randomly decelerate. In panel (a), the coop-
erator accelerates one unit and decelerate one unit due to the
random deceleration. Because the defector can land in a site
after the cooperator, the overtaking is successful. Notice that
in the next step the blue vehicle will have a velocity equal to
one, whereas the red vehicle may keep its maximum velocity.
In panel (b), the cooperator accelerates one unit and does
not decelerate, advancing three sites. Because the defector
does not have enough velocity to arrive after the black rod,
he must reduce his velocity to one, behaving effectively as a
cooperator.
III. RESULTS
To analyze the effects of individual behavior in the
traffic and to understand the incentive structure at the
individual level, we focus on two measures: the flux of
vehicles and the individual payoff. The flux of vehicles
is the number of vehicles crossing a detector per time
unit [10, 11]. The fundamental hypothesis that at any
point of the road the flow is a function of the density
of cars suggests that the flux versus concentration dia-
gram, also known as the fundamental diagram, charac-
terizes the system [13]. Although this hypothesis may
not be consistent with all traffic phenomena [11], the
fundamental diagram is a good descriptor of the aver-
age macroscopic properties of the system. The average
flux, ρ, is calculated as ρ = v¯c, where v¯ is the average
velocity and c is the global density of cars.
The individual payoff takes into account all the fac-
tors that influence the decision of one individual. In our
model, the core of the payoff is the commute time. Since
the size of the road is constant and no alternative routes
are available, the only way to minimize the commute time
is to drive faster. Hence, the average velocity of the in-
dividual is a natural measure of the individual payoff.
Note that the average flux is a measure of the road ca-
pacity, which is fundamentally distinct from the concept
of individual payoff. The free-flow regime is a good ex-
ample to illustrate the distinction between average flux
and individual payoff. In the free-flow regime, the cars
are most of the time at their maximum velocity. Thus, it
is not possible to increase the individuals’ payoff. How-
ever, if the density increases (the system being still in the
free-flow regime), the average velocity remains the same
and the flux increases. Therefore, the average flux is not
the proper quantifier to measure neither the individual’s
nor the social payoffs, the latter being considered as the
average individual payoff.
Thus, the following questions arise: is overtaking good
for the population as a whole? Is there any social
dilemma? If so, which mechanism creates the social
dilemma? In the next sections, we provide answers to
these questions.
A. Insights based on the analytical results
The deterministic model, p = 0, allows analytical
treatment, shedding light to the nature of our problem.
The fundamental diagram for a homogenous population
of cooperators (ALLC) and for a homogenous population
of defectors (ALLD) with p = 0 is shown in Fig. 2. Notice
that at intermediate values of concentration the average
flux of a population of defectors is lower than that of a
population of cooperators. In homogeneous populations,
the average flux is easily related to the average individual
payoff at constant density by J = cv¯. Thus, the average
individual payoff in ALLC population is higher than that
in the ALLD population. In other words, overtaking can
be detrimental to the population.
To arrive at the analytical expression of the flux, let us
begin with the ALLC population, where the individuals
follows the NaSch model. At low values of c, the vehicles
reach their maximum velocity for any initial condition
(after a short transient interval) and are at least vmax
sites apart. As more vehicles are added to the system,
the mean distance between the vehicles is reduced and,
at c2 = 1/(1 + vmax), all vehicles are exactly vmax sites
apart. Thus, the flux of the ALLC population for c < c2
is given by the function
J(c) = vmaxc.
4c1 c2 c3
FIG. 2. Fundamental diagram for the homogeneous popu-
lations of cooperators and defectors. The lines represent the
functions J(c) = 5c , J(c) = .504c + .499, and J(c) = 1 − c
deduced in the text. The images in details are the temporal-
spatial pattern of the ALLC population (above) and ALLD
population (below), both initialized under the same random
spatial configuration and velocities at p = 0 and c = 0.2174.
The darker the region the denser the local configuration.
Time is measured from below to top and space from right to
left. Notice that the 2-cycle emerges in the transient regime
and absorb all the non-homogeneities of the system increasing
in size. The values of c1, c2, and c3 are provided in the main
text.
To analyze the case c > c2, let us define the total velocity
in the stationary state, V , as the sum of the velocities of
all vehicles, that is, V =
∑N
i=1 vi. Is is easy to see that for
c < c2 we have that V = Nvmax, where N is the number
of vehicles. In the congested phase, the velocities of the
vehicles depend on the space available. In a stationary
configuration (stationary except for translations), the ve-
locities correlate strongly with the available space, and
vi can be approximated by vi = xi+1 − xi − 1. Then,
V =
N∑
i=1
vi =
N∑
i=1
xi+1 − xi − 1 = L−N.
Notice that we have used the boundary condition xi+N =
xi +L. Thus, the analytical expression of the flux in the
congested phase is given by
J(c) = cv¯ = (N/L)(V/N) = V/L = 1− c.
The expression of the flux for c > c2 does not depend on
the maximum velocity vmax and is a good approximation
for any maximum velocity. Also, because vmax appears
explicitly at the expression of c2, there is a nice geomet-
rical visualization: the perpendicular which crosses the
J(c) curve at the critical density c2 forms an isosceles
triangle with the c axes, having the congested phase line
as the hypotenuse for any value of vmax.
The behavior of the ALLD population is identical to
the behavior of the ALLC population at low concentra-
tion. Thus, the flux is given by J(c) = vmaxc. However,
at a concentration c1 (c1 < c2) an interesting feature
emerges. Let # represent an empty site and suppose
that the configuration 2##20## appears (the number
represents the velocity of the vehicle localized in that
site). Following our algorithm, this configuration evolves
to ##2##13. Notice that the #13# is a forbidden con-
figuration in the NaSch model and is often referred to
as Garden of Eden (GoE) state [33, 34]. This configura-
tion evolves to #2##20#, which is identical to the initial
one, but translated in one unity. Thus, there is a dynam-
ical 2-cycle moving forward with mean velocity given by
vcy = 0.5. If the local region is dense enough, there will
be an increasing accumulation of vehicles behind the 2-
cycle (the ##2##2 pattern). Since the 2-cycle loses one
vehicle each two time steps, if the environment feeds the
leftmost part of the pattern at a higher rate, the pattern
will grow. The critical rate is one vehicle each two time
steps. Assuming that the vehicles feeding the pattern are
in the free state, then in two time steps they move 2vmax
sites. Meanwhile, the pattern moves one site forward.
Remembering that the fundamental unity of the pattern
is 2## (a vehicle effectively occupy three sites), this im-
plies that at a concentration of c1 = 1/(2vmax−1) (notice
that c1 < c2) the rate of evaporation of vehicles will be
the same as the rate of absorption. Consequently, the
dynamics of these patterns will be stable. If c > c2, this
phase will emerge during the transient state and grow,
except in initial eigen-configurations of the NaSch algo-
rithm which do not contain the local configuration 20##
anywhere. The eigen-configurations have vanishing small
probabilities at the thermodynamic limit if random ini-
tial configurations are chosen and, therefore, the NaSch
like pattern loses stability to the emerging 2-cycle. It
turns out that the size of the 2-cycle pattern depends on
the local density of vehicles and is as a self-organizing
mechanism. The pattern will grow where there are many
particles and shrink where there are few. The result is
the coexistence of two highly organized phases: a free
phase with density proportional to the evaporation rate
of the 2-cycle pattern (c = 1/(2vmax − 1)), and mean
velocity given by v¯f = vmax; and the organized 2-cycle
pattern with mean velocity of vs = 2 and density c = 1/3.
Increasing the density above c1 will increase the 2-cycle
pattern size (its evaporation rate is constant) until there
is no more space available, which happens at a global
density equivalent to its own internal density c3 = 1/3.
We may approximate the flux of vehicles summing the
flux of the free phase to the flux of the slower 2-cycle
pattern pondered by their characteristic density at the
global density c:
J(c) = [1+(c−c1)/(c1−c3)]c1vmax+[(c1−c)/(c1−c3)]c3v¯s.
For our parameters we have that J(c) ≈ 0.504c+ 0.499.
At concentrations higher than c3, the cycle is destroyed
by the perturbations caused by the extra vehicles and, as
5overtaking is no longer possible due to the high symmetry
produced by the slow pattern, the Nasch-like behavior
reemerge, and J(c) = 1− c.
To sum up, the flux difference between the ALLD and
the ALLC population is then given by
∆J(c) =


0 c ≤ c1
f(c)− vmaxc c1 ≤ c ≤ c2
f(c)− (1− c) c2 ≤ c ≤ c3
0 c ≥ c3
where f(c) is the flux in the ALLD population c1 ≤ c ≤
c3. Because the flux difference is negative in the interval
c1 ≤ c ≤ c3 and v¯ = J/c, the deterministic case shows
that overtaking can indeed be detrimental for everyone.
B. Simulation results for p 6= 0
The deterministic limit does not include random de-
celeration, which is a very important component of the
NaSch model. In this session, we investigate with com-
puter simulations the behavior of the system when p 6= 0.
Figure 3 shows the fundamental diagram of the ALLC
and ALLD populations for different values of p. The dif-
ference between the ALLC and the ALLD fluxes is very
small at low and high concentrations. The reason is that
overtaking is improbable at low concentrations due to the
high velocity of the vehicles and, at high concentrations,
due to the lack of free space. However, near the transi-
tion from the free to the congested traffic, the overtaking
behavior shows up and a non-trivial behavior dependent
on the probability of random deceleration emerges: for
low values of p the average flux of the ALLC population
is higher than that of the ALLD population. Thus, there
is a conflict between the individual self-interest and the
common good under these conditions.
To characterize the emergence of the social dilemma,
we can vary the fraction of the types in the population
and measure the variations of their payoffs [34]. Figure
4 shows the average velocity as a function of the density
of defectors. The payoff of the defectors is always greater
than that of the cooperators, independently of the con-
centration of defectors. If the probability of random de-
celeration is small, the average payoff of the population
decreases as the number of defectors increases. There-
fore, the population is better off if all individuals cooper-
ate. This scenario characterizes a social dilemma, where
the individual’s willingness to maximize his own payoff
drives the population to a state that is worse than a state
where everyone cooperates. This social dilemma is of the
same kind that is present in the tragedy of commons and
in the prisoner’s dilemma game. On the other side, for
higher values of the probability of deceleration, the so-
cial optimum and the individual self-interest are aligned:
both the defectors’ payoff and the average population
payoff increases if the fraction of defectors increases. In
this scenario, there is no social dilemma: it is the best,
both for the individual and for the population, to adopt
defection.
The difference between the average payoff of the co-
operators and defectors is small because the overtaking
does not happen in every attempt. Figure 3-c shows that,
even in the ALLD population, at most only 2.6% of the
vehicles overtake. However, if we measure the average
velocity of the defectors that successfully overtakes, the
gain is significant, as shown in Fig. 5. Therefore, al-
though the effect over the average payoffs is small, the
choice of the strategy is relevant to the individual.
To have a clearer picture of the non-trivial depen-
dence of the individual payoffs on the random deceler-
ation probability, we analyze the interactions among the
vehicles. The interactions take place only when cars have
to reduce their velocities due to the short headway dis-
tances. Also, the interactions are asymmetrical, that is,
the car in the front affects only the car behind. Although
the interactions are pairwise, there can be a cascade of
braking events affecting many vehicles behind. To quan-
tify the effect of the cascade of braking events, we mea-
sured the correlation of the velocities of the vehicles, as
shown in Fig. 6. In the ALLC population, the harmful
effects of the interactions persist for many vehicles, but it
is almost independent of the random deceleration proba-
bility. On the other hand, in the ALLD population, it is
strongly dependent on p. The correlation is higher at low
p values, that is, the overtaking increases the size of the
interacting groups and the harmful effects of overtaking
spread to the system, with many vehicles being hindered
by the actions of the defector. The correlation drops sig-
nificantly for high p values, that is, the harmful effects of
the interactions are relatively localized and the costs of
overtaking are paid by the nearby neighbors of the over-
taking defector. Hence, for high p values, the harmful
effect of the overtaking does not escalate and the social
dilemma does not emerge.
C. Discontinuities at ρ = 1 and p = 0
The simulation results indicate that the flux, as a func-
tion of c, p and ρ (concentration of vehicles, probability
of random deceleration, and fraction of defectors, respec-
tively), is a continuous function except along the line
defined by p = 0, ρ = 1 and c1 < c < c3. This disconti-
nuity is important because it is related to the problem of
invasion of a mutant strategy. In this section, we discuss
this discontinuity.
Let us first fix ρ = 1 so that J = J(c, p). In the limit
p → 0, the behavior of the ALLD population is very
similar to that of the deterministic model, which is char-
acterized by the 2-cycle overtaking pattern. Recall that
the 2-cycle produces the forward-moving pattern shown
in the detail of Fig. 2. This pattern, however, is very
unstable. The perturbations introduced by the random
deceleration breake the overtaking pattern and the sys-
tem behaves like an ALLC population, as overtaking is no
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FIG. 3. Fundamental diagram analysis. (a) The fundamental diagram of homogeneous populations for different values of the
probability of random deceleration.The diagram has two typical behaviors: free-flow and congested traffic. If p is sufficiently
small, there is a region near the transition where the ALLD curve lies beneath the ALLC diagram. At high p, the ALLC curve
lies entirely under the ALLD curve. Also, notice that the curves for both populations are nearly the same at the free-flow
regime and converge to the same values as the density gets higher. The standard deviation is smaller than the size of the
symbols. (b) The difference of the flux between the homogeneous populations of cooperators and defectors for many p values.
The difference is given by ∆J = Jd − Jc, where Jd and Jc are the fluxes in each homogeneous populations. (c) The mean
number of overtaking per vehicle per time unit, O, in function of the global concentration c. Notice that the highest number
of overtaking happens near the onset of jammed behavior because of the large variance of the velocities and the availability of
space for a safe overtaking.
longer possible due to the great symmetry produced by
the overtaking pattern. Nevertheless, the overtaking pat-
tern reemerges and may take over the population again
as a consequence of p 6= 0. Consequently, the system
oscillates between both patterns. Let JC be the char-
acteristic flux of the ALLC population and JD that of
ALLD population under this scenario. Let τC and τD be
the characteristic times spent in each state. The flux can
be approximated by:
J(c, p) =
τDJD + τCJC
τD + τC
.
The average time spent in the state that exhibits the
2-cycle overtaking pattern is roughly given by τD ≈
1/(Np), because the pattern breaks as soon as the over-
taking vehicle in the 2-cycle is prevented to overtake due
to the random deceleration. On the other side, the over-
taking pattern can emerge again if two events take place.
First, one vehicle inside the dense local patch is sub-
jected to the random deceleration, creating a defect in-
side the patch (composed of a vehicle with velocity v = 1)
and, second, this defect is again subjected to the random
deceleration, producing a particle with velocity v = 0.
Thus, τD ≈ 1/((N − Lc1)p)
2. In the limit p→ 0, τD in-
creases faster than τC and the system spends more time
in the overtaking pattern so that J(c, p) → JD. There-
fore, J(c, p) is continuous at p = 0.
Let us now fix p = 0 so that J = J(c, ρ). In this
case, any small amount of cooperator in the popula-
tion will eventually breake the 2-cycle overtaking pat-
tern. Because p = 0, the 2-cycle overtaking pattern
cannot emerge again. Therefore, the system exhibits a
discontinuity at ρ = 1 so that limρ→1 J(c, ρ) = JC and
J(c, 1) = JD, where JD and JC are the same as described
in the previous paragraph.
Because at p = 0 we have that J(c, ρ) = JC for ρ 6=
1, the flux difference between the ALLC and the ALLD
populations is equal to zero, except at ρ = 1. Hence, the
social dilemma that emerges in the deterministic case is
just a weaker version of the dilemma.
D. More realistic single-lane algorithms
To test the robustness of our findings we analyzed a
more realistic model in single-lane that incorporates an-
ticipation in order to prevent strong braking events [19].
In the original model, the velocity of the leading car is
anticipated, allowing smother deceleration in function of
the lack of available space. At large distances, the drivers
move as fast as possible and, at intermediate distances,
the drivers respond to the brake lights. Finally, at small
distances, the drivers adjust their velocity to drive as safe
as possible. In particular, the value of the random de-
celeration p is determined by a set of conditions: if the
vehicle is at rest, then p = p0; if the next vehicle has its
brake lights on and is inside the interaction radio, then
p = pb; in any other case p = pd. If the vehicle deceler-
ates, or p = pb, its brake lights turn on.
We implemented the overtaking strategy similarly to
what we did to the NaSch model. The defector can over-
take as many vehicles as possible and, when overtaking
is possible, the driver ignores the brake lights of the next
vehicle, accelerates if the velocity limit allows, and is sub-
jected to p = pd. The last overtaken vehicle has its brake
light turned on.
The overreaction of the vehicles that are overtaken is
important in our minimal model. Hence, it should also
play an important role in the more realistic model. One
way to control this effect is to change the scale of pa-
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FIG. 4. Average velocity as a function of the fraction of
defectors. The graph shows simulation data for the average
payoff of the defectors (red), cooperators (green), and the av-
erage population payoff (black). In (a), where the probability
of deceleration is small, the payoff of the defectors is always
higher, but the social optima is achieved if everyone cooper-
ates, indicating that defection is a Nash equilibrium [35–37].
In (b), where the probability of deceleration is higher, the
individual self-interest and the social optima are aligned: it
is always better for the individual to defect and the social
optimum is achieved if everyone defects. The parameters are
c = 0.18 for both graphs and p = 0.05 in (a) and p = 0.2 in
(b).
rameters so that the size of the acceleration steps are
smaller in comparison to the abrupt deceleration caused
by the overtaking. More specifically, the maximum ve-
locity vmax, the size of the vehicle s, the security gap b,
and the length of the highway L are all increased by the
same factor α (we call it the α-model). As the time step
is unchanged and we have yet to present the results in
physical unities, a larger size of the highway under this
transformation implies finer acceleration steps. Figure
7 shows the flux difference between the ALLC and the
ALLD population in the α−model. The social dilemma
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FIG. 5. Average velocity in the ALLD population formed
after aggregation the defectors in terms of their effective be-
haviour. The defectors that overtake successfully (effective
defectors) are shown in full lines and the defectors that fail
to overtake (effective cooperators) in dashed lines. Notice
that only vehicles that attempt to overtake are included in
the averaging. The average velocity of the effective defectors
is always higher than that of the effective cooperators. At
low concentrations, the velocity of the effective defectors is
erratic due to the small number of successful overtaking. No-
tice that at very high concentrations, c=0.99, the mean veloc-
ity of effective defectors is the smaller speed possible allowing
overtaking (v = 2).
in the more realistic model emerges if α is sufficiently high
because it becomes harder to recover the speed after the
abrupt deceleration caused by the overtaking. The over-
reactions occur immediately after the overtaking, causing
strong correlations in the velocities of the vehicles.
We measured the ratio of frustrated overtaking (when
the overtaking is initiated but could not be completed),
continuous overtaking (when the overtaking vehicle does
not decelerate to overtake), and accelerating overtaking
(when the overtaking vehicle have to decelerate but over-
takes after some time).
It turns out that at low global density, 31% were frus-
trated, 6% were accelerating and 62% were continuous.
On the other hand, at high global density these ratios
change to 93%, 2% and 5%, respectively. These measure-
ments and comparison with the experimental data sug-
gests that the drivers in the model are very aggressive (in
[5–8] the ratio of continuous overtaking is taken as a indi-
rect measurement of aggressiveness among drivers), but
not as aggressive as drivers studied in undivided roads in
some parts of India [5].
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The NaSch model contains the key ingredients to simu-
late basic features of real vehicular traffic. We introduced
overtaking as an action where the driver must analyze if
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FIG. 6. Correlation between the velocities of a focal vehicle
and its j-th neighbor (x-axis). The graph shows the average
taken after considering every car as the focal one in homo-
geneous populations of cooperators and defectors for low and
high p values, all at c = 0.20. Notice that for the ALLC pop-
ulation the correlation has a weak dependence on p. On the
other side, in ALLD population the correlation is relatively
strong for p = 0.01 and weak for p = 0.20.
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FIG. 7. The difference between the fluxes of ALLD and
ALLC population in the α-model. The advantage of the
overtaking strategy decreases sharply as α increases. The
dilemma appears because of the asymmetry between the ac-
celeration (slow process) and deceleration (fast process) in
braking events caused by the lack of space.
there is space available and if its velocity is sufficient to
make the manoeuvre. In more realistic scenarios, the
driver would have to analyze the traffic in the contiguous
lane with opposite traffic, but we do not add this fac-
tor to our model. We started with the minimal NaSch
model because of its simplicity, which allows an analyti-
cal treatment of the deterministic case. As the analysis
of a more realistic model showed, as long as there is an
abrupt arrival of the defector in front of an overtaken car,
overtaking can create a social dilemma. Hence, the social
dilemma may appear in more realistic single-lane traffic
models if there is an asymmetry between acceleration, as
a slow process, and the deceleration as a response to the
lack of space available, as we have shown. Notice that the
defector overtakes precisely to avoid this deceleration.
The effect of overtaking depends strongly on the prob-
ability of random deceleration. The random deceleration
causes the spontaneous formation of jams in the NaSch
model and is one of the factors that control the emer-
gence of the social dilemma when overtaking is allowed.
The social dilemma emerges if the probability of random
deceleration is small and it is caused by the strong cor-
relations between the vehicles. Interestingly, the random
deceleration can be interpreted as a random intrinsic re-
sponse of the driver to the imperfections of the road [32].
Under this interpretation, we can say that, if the overall
condition of the road is good, the population harvests
better results if all cooperate, being more patient and
complying with the ordered flow of vehicles.
In typical examples of cooperation [38], the cooperator
is the active agent who provides a benefit to the recipient
at a cost to himself. The defector is the passive recipient,
who free-ride on the cooperative behavior of others. In
our model, the defectors are the active agents, because
their actions provide benefits to themselves and inflict
costs to the population, whereas the cooperators are the
passive agents that suffer the costs. Because the inter-
actions may involve more than two individuals, it is not
possible to write down a simple payoff matrix as in the
two-player prisoner’s dilemma. Nevertheless, the nature
of the game played by the drivers in our model is clearly
one that exhibits a social dilemma, as shown in Fig. 4
and 5.
The identification of social dilemmas in vehicular traf-
fic systems is important because minimizing the driver’s
time spent on the road (individual payoff) may not align
with the goals of traffic engineering, as the maximization
of the flux of vehicles (social payoff at c constant). Our
study shows that, under certain circumstances, overtak-
ing is good because it increases both the road capacity
and minimizes the driver’s mean time spent on the road.
However, when these conditions are not met, overtaking
is harmful to all. In this case, one may have to identify
mechanisms that promote cooperation.
Vehicular traffic is a social phenomenon. The high
population density in the big cities creates complex so-
cial interactions which can certainly be improved if the
individuals take cooperation seriously. As shown here,
cooperation is again playing a major role in a basic part
of human life: moving from here to there.
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9APPENDIX: THE ALGORITHM
The update starts with the choice of the first car to
have its velocity updated. To avoid artificial effects
caused by the choice of the first car, in every step we
find the car with the largest velocity and we pick the car
that comes behind it to be the first to update the velocity.
In this way, because we know for sure that the first cho-
sen car will not overtake, we don’t need any information
about the car in front, which is needed in our algorithm.
Notice that all information is available for the other cars
. Interestingly, if we had initiated the update with a
randomly chosen vehicle and force this car to behave as
cooperator, such small perturbation would destroy the
patterns formed in the deterministic case (p = 0), mak-
ing the system to have a NaSch-like dynamics. It is sim-
ilar to the phenomenon observed at the discontinuity at
ρ = 1.
After the first car is chosen, the following update rules
are applied. Let xn and vn be the position and the veloc-
ity of the n-th vehicle. If the driver is a cooperator, the
NaSch algorithm is implemented. If the driver is a de-
fector, the following steps are implemented. In the first
step, the vehicle accelerates one unity. In the second step,
the driver evaluates the available space available, which
is given by Gn = xn+1 − xn − 1. If vn ≤ Gn + vn+1,
then the driver follows the NaSch algorithm, manifest-
ing a cooperator-like behavior. On the other hand, if
vn > Gn + vn+1, then the vehicle is subjected to the
random deceleration and, if there is a j such that
xn+j+1 > xn + vn > xn+j + vn+j , (A.1)
the overtaking is successful. The left inequality means
that the driver follows the NaSch algorithm, interacting
with the (n+j+1)-th vehicle (ignoring the others), which
is a characteristic of a non-one-dimensional problem. The
second inequality means that the defector will not force
the overtaken vehicles to decelerate at the moment of
the overtaking, which can be regarded as a security con-
dition. The vehicles may overtake as many vehicles as
possible. As long as j > 1 and at least one of the inequal-
ities in A.1 is not satisfied, we make vn = xn+j − xn − 1,
j = j − 1, and try again, until both inequalities in A.1
are satisfied or j = 0. If all overtaking attempts are
failed, we are back to the original NaSch algorithm and
the driver behaves as a cooperator. The general scheme
of the algorithm is the following:
step 1: vn = min(vn + 1, vmax) FOR ALL n;
DO n=M,M-N
step 2’: IF[v′n ≤ Gn + vn+1)]THEN
v′n = min(vn, Gn)
v′n = max(vn − 1, 0), with probability p;
CYCLE
END IF
step 2: IF[xn+j+1 > (v
′
n + xn) > (v
′
n+j + xn+j)]
for some j > 0;
v′n = max(vn − 1, 0), with probability p;
IF[(v′n + xn) == (v
′
n+j + xn+j)]
v′n = xn+j − xn − 1;
j = j − 1;
GO TO STEP 2’;
END IF
CYCLE
ELSE
v′n = xn+j − xn − 1;
j = j − 1;
GO TO STEP 2’;
END IF
END DO
~x′ = ~x+ ~v′;
REORDER ~x′;
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